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Abstract
Background: This paper examines NHS secondary care contracting in England and Wales in a period which saw
increasing policy divergence between the two systems. At face value, England was making greater use of market
levers and utilising harder-edged service contracts incorporating financial penalties and incentives, while Wales was
retreating from the 1990s internal market and emphasising cooperation and flexibility in the contracting process.
But there were also cross-border spill-overs involving common contracting technologies and management cultures
that meant that differences in on-the-ground contracting practices might be smaller than headline policy
differences suggested.
Methods: The nature of real-world contracting behaviour was investigated by undertaking two qualitative case
studies in England and two in Wales, each based on a local purchaser/provider network. The case studies involved
ethnographic observations and interviews with staff in primary care trusts (PCTs) or local health boards (LHBs), NHS
or Foundation trusts, and the overseeing Strategic Health Authority or NHS Wales regional office, as well as scrutiny
of relevant documents.
Results: Wider policy differences between the two NHS systems were reflected in differing contracting frameworks,
involving regional commissioning in Wales and commissioning by either a PCT, or co-operating pair of PCTs in our
English case studies, and also in different oversight arrangements by higher tiers of the service. However, long-
term relationships and trust between purchasers and providers had an important role in both systems when the
financial viability of organisations was at risk. In England, the study found examples where both PCTs and trusts
relaxed contractual requirements to assist partners faced with deficits. In Wales, news of plans to end the
purchaser/provider split meant a return to less precisely-specified block contracts and a renewed concern to build
cooperation between LHB and trust staff.
Conclusions: The interdependency of local purchasers and providers fostered long-term relationships and co-
operation that shaped contracting behaviour, just as much as the design of contracts and the presence or absence
of contractual penalties and incentives. Although conflict and tensions between contracting partners sometimes
surfaced in both the English and Welsh case studies, cooperative behaviour became crucial in times of trouble.
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Introduction
This paper examines NHS contracting in England and
Wales in 2008-10, at a time when widening policy differ-
ences between the two countries created a natural experi-
ment involving what at face value were respectively ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ versions of the internal market. We put forward
three related propositions about contracting in public-
sector quasi-markets that are consistent with the findings
of our empirical study. We contend that policy designs
that emphasize hard market levers, such as fully-specified
(‘complete’) contracts, formal dispute resolution proce-
dures, financial penalties and pay-for-performance incen-
tives, underestimate the importance of informal social
norms and long-term relationships in real markets, and
risk manufacturing an artificial market environment in
which actors fall back on informal relationships to keep
the system working. Because ongoing relationships and a
flexible interpretation of rules are crucial under both
hard and soft contracting regimes, the extent of on-the-
ground operational differences between England and
Wales was smaller than headline policy statements might
suggest. Moving forward, the tendency of policy makers
to neglect co-operation and organisational norms, and to
push instead for a strengthening of competition and mar-
ket incentives, as has occurred in England, threatens to
dismantle the relational networks that keep the NHS
working and may de-stabilise the system.
When the Labour Party returned to power at the 1997
general election there was an initial move away from the
language of markets and competition that had charac-
terised the early years of the NHS internal market, and
less emphasis than before on contracts as instruments for
managing provider performance. However, devolution
and the creation of national assemblies in Wales, Scot-
land and Northern Ireland opened a space for policy
divergence, and by about 2002 English policy makers,
concerned that increased public spending had not yielded
commensurate service improvements, again turned to
market ideas to reinvigorate the NHS in England. The
‘supply-side market’ that emerged was constructed from
five interlocking components: foundation trust hospitals
with increased operational autonomy; arm’s-length regu-
latory bodies independent from the Department of
Health (DH) to oversee providers; greater use of private-
sector providers for elective surgery; a new ‘payment-by-
results’ (PbR) financing system that allowed any provider
willing to undertake NHS work at national tariff prices to
compete to treat NHS patients, and the right of patients
needing planned surgery to choose the hospital that
would perform and be paid for this treatment. But while
England moved swiftly to implement these reforms, the
devolved governments in the other home countries
found this path unattractive. Northern Ireland stayed
close to the status quo ante, while Scotland opted to end
the purchaser/provider split and establish unified health
boards. In the period covered by this research Wales con-
tinued with a soft version of the internal market, and
since then has followed Scotland’s lead by abolishing the
purchaser/provider split and merging the old local health
boards (LHBs) and NHS trusts into unified boards.
Yet despite headline policy differences, there were strik-
ing similarities of approach in many areas of contracting
practice in England and Wales. Many elements of the
technology of contracting and the culture of management
spilled over from one system to the other. Both countries
utilised national template contracts which imposed a mea-
sure of standardisation and set limits on variation in local
agreements. While England tended to use health resource
groups and provider spells as contract currencies, against
Wales’ average specialty prices and deaths and discharges,
we found that English organisations did not always reim-
burse strictly on PbR tariff and that price negotiation and
block contracts could still appear in the English system, as
they did in Wales. The two systems utilised broadly similar
risk management and demand management strategies, and
similar dispute resolution arrangements applied.
Relational contract theory [1] predicts that it is beha-
viour rather than rules that shapes contractual relations.
This helps explain the many similarities in contracting
practices in England and Wales, and also the occasional
deviation from official policy.
Methods
This study was undertaken during a period of considerable
turbulence in the NHS, which changed the nature of pur-
chaser/provider relationships in both countries, and forced
changes in the original research aims. What had been con-
ceived as a straightforward comparison of contracting prac-
tice in contrasting national cases, ended up providing a
snapshot of two systems in transition and raised the ques-
tion of what contracting practices in the late 2000s might
teach us about the prospects of the latest NHS reforms.
The study centred on two English and two Welsh case
studies, which each examined relations between a local
purchaser and the associated secondary care providers
(the NHS hospital trusts in that locality). In one English
case study (Beta), we included two primary care trusts
(PCTs) that had coordinated their purchasing and worked
with the same cluster of providers. The case study sites
selected included one predominantly urban and one
mixed urban/rural area in each country. Additional data
were gathered on agencies from the wider regulatory
environment, such as the Care Quality Commission,
Monitor, Health Commission Wales and Healthcare
Inspectorate Wales.
The research took a similar approach to other recent
‘policy ethnographies’ that utilise a combination of non-
participant observation, interviews and documentary
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analysis to examine NHS management processes [2-4].
We observed a variety of meetings involving inter alia
contract negotiations and monitoring, individual patient
commissioning, waiting list management and NHS
reconfiguration (see: Table 1). Interviews were com-
pleted with purchaser and provider staff involved in
contracting, including chief executives and finance
directors, and also with staff in Strategic Health Autho-
rities (SHAs) and Welsh regional offices (see: Table 2).
Most meetings and all interviews were tape recorded
and fully transcribed. In addition, we scrutinised rele-
vant policy documents, including English and Welsh
standard contract templates, individual PCT/trust and
LHB/trust contracts, annual operating frameworks, and
various national guidelines, commissioning intentions,
financial statements and local targets.
The study aimed to cover two contracting cycles,
spread over the 2008-09 and 2009-10 financial years.
This was achieved with English case study Alpha and
the two Welsh case studies (Delta and Gamma). Obser-
vations for English case study Beta extended only over
the 2009/10 year, but the interviews gathered data on
the two year period.
Overall then, the fieldwork in England was more nar-
rowly focused on the routine work of contracting, while
that in Wales was concerned with reporting how com-
missioning was being taken forward in a system where
routine contracting work was winding down and organi-
sations were about to be restructured. Interviews in both
countries were carried out to supplement the observa-
tions, and also to provide information on the wider ser-
vice environments.
The social embedding of economic activity
The analysis developed here follows a well-established
strand of social theory that insists that economic activity
is not shaped by individual utility-maximising behaviour
alone, but also by social norms and relationships. This is
common theme that binds together writings as diverse
as Durkheim’s analysis of the normative basis of con-
tracts [5], Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ whereby swings
towards unrestrained markets spark corrective attempts
to re-build social cohesion, and Granovetter’s work on
the ‘smoothing role of social relations in the market’ [7]
[p.501]. The idea that social relations and norms that
discourage malfeasance can bring order to economic life
provides a powerful counterpoint to the argument of
senior policy advisors in England that incentives should
be re-designed so as to harness and control self-inter-
ested behaviour [8,9]. Granovetter’s analysis suggests
that where problems arise it may be interpersonal rela-
tionships rather than economic incentives that allow
organisations to keep working smoothly, and that
reforms that undermine existing relational networks
may have highly negative consequences [7].
The socio-legal theorist Ian Macneil argues in a similar
vein that exchange transactions necessarily occur within a
‘social matrix’ and follow characteristic ‘relational pat-
terns’[1][p.344-5]. Macneil suggests that contracts between
modern enterprises are almost invariably part of a longer-
term relationship between the parties, so that an economic
analysis based on rational calculations of advantage in sin-
gle, ‘discrete’ exchanges has limited utility in explaining
real-world behaviour. The formal agreements incorporated
in contracts do provide some safeguards for the parties
and all contracts rest upon norms of planning, precision
and completeness (‘presentiation’) associated with the clas-
sical conception of the contract as a statement of the con-
ditions governing the transaction. But Macneil contends
that there are also important ‘relational’ norms such as
flexibility, solidarity and reciprocity, which derive from the
economic and social context of the transaction [1,10].
Here his position comes close to Williamson’s contention
that where long-term contracts are involved, and in a con-
text characterised by high specificity of assets, successful
relationships depend on a high degree of co-operation and
trust [11,12]. Macneil predicts that both discrete and rela-
tional norms are involved to a greater or lesser degree,
and that though there are likely to be shifts in the balance
over time, an excessive swing in one direction will cause
problems. Thus a greater concentration on the discrete
norms of contract planning and ‘completeness’ – by
attempting to draft a ‘hard’ contract that builds in appro-
priate incentives, fixes responsibilities, specifies what
Table 1 Meetings observed
England Wales
Case Study Alpa Case Study Beta Case Study Delta Case Study Gamma
Contracting Meetings 22 10 7 5
Quality 3 1
Individual Patient Commissioning 11
Cross-border Commissioning 1 1
Reconfiguration/ finance/demand management/clinical networks 16
Note. In Wales, regular contracting meetings were suspended with the impending restructuring of the service, and instead we observed meetings concerned
with planning the unified health board framework that would replace contracting. In the text the organisations within Alpha case study, are labelled as Alpha
PCT, Alpha trust1, Alpha trust2 and so on, to indicate that their association.
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happens when unexpected events arise, and is rigorously
enforced – might be predicted to lead to conflictual or
adversarial relations with high costs to both parties.
It must be acknowledged that, though they share much
common ground, scholars who have examined the argu-
ments about social embedding disagree on many impor-
tant issues [13]. Over time there are likely to be junctures
when both market levers and co-operative behaviour are
brought into play. In terms of Macneil’s contractual
norms, there are moments when discrete norms con-
cerned with completeness and formal enforcement come
to the fore, while at other points co-operation and trust
are important. Because Macneil accepts that actors may
put more or less emphasis on discrete versus relational
norms at different times his theory is not easily falsified,
and what this paper offers is less a test of the theory than
an exemplification of how far it fits with the empirical
data collected. The sections that follow document a num-
ber of observed instances where NHS purchasers and pro-
viders do not hold the other party strictly to the letter of
the contract, and instead cooperate to agree compromise
solutions that keep the NHS market working in difficult
times.
The internal market as a hybrid
For Macneil the relational norms are important in all
contractual relations, including within the private sector.
Of course, the NHS differs in important ways from the
ordinary business world, not least because government
requires that purchasers and providers enter contracts
with local partners, and that the parties continue to be
subject to hierarchical governance (bureaucratic com-
mand) as well as what is agreed in the contracts. The
typical NHS contract is not a freely-entered agreement,
subject to possible non-renewal, and it co-exists with
other bureaucratic commitments (such as annual oper-
ating frameworks) that limit the parties’ space for
manoeuvre.
Building on Oliver Williamson’s analysis of markets
and hierarchies [11,12], much recent scholarship has
examined the intermediate governance forms that may
have developed, including the mix of centralised and
decentralised instruments used to control public-sector
quasi-markets [14]. A considerable body of scholarly
research completed since 1991 has described an NHS
‘managed market’, subject to considerable governmental
control and shaped by associated systems of account-
ability and performance management [15-17]. Like the
1990s internal market, the English and Welsh systems
of the early 2000s were hybrids, which combined mar-
ket-based and command-and-control mechanisms. Con-
tracts, statutory duties, and voluntary action all played a
part, and structural or organisational differences
between the two countries was also beginning to trans-
late into differences in contracting practices.
In England there were bigger roles for arm’s-length
bodies, private providers and consumer choice [18,19].
Regulation depended on a mix of central and decentralised
controls operating differentially across the system, so that,
for example, while old-style NHS trusts were ‘performance
managed’ by the Strategic Health Authorities, the founda-
tion hospitals were overseen by the arm’s-length regulator,
Monitor. PCTs remained subject to hierarchical command
from both the department and SHA, impeding the full
transfer of regulatory functions to Monitor and the Care
Quality Commission [20]. On the one hand there was a
policy drive to promote competition by developing legally
enforceable contracts between NHS purchasers and cor-
poratized foundation trusts, private sector and third sector
providers, as well as soft contracts with conventional
trusts. But on the other hand providers had to take
account of departmental guidance which defined the fra-
mework within which these market mechanisms would
operate.
In 2007 a programme was launched to support the
vision of ‘world class commissioning’ and promote a
more strategic, long-term and community-focused
approach to commissioning services [21]. Alongside
developing skills in areas such as needs assessment and
priority setting, ‘world class commissioners effectively sti-
mulate the market to meet demand and secure required
clinical, and health and well-being outcomes’ [21][p.21].
Revised principles and rules for co-operation and compe-
tition (PRCC) were published which required providers
to select the ‘best’ providers on the basis of quality and
best-value [22]. As the study progressed, quality improve-
ment was emphasised as one of the key functions of com-
missioning. A Commissioning for Quality and Innovation
(CQUIN) initiative [23] was implemented in 2009/10,
involving a payment-for-performance scheme under
Table 2 Interviews completed
England Wales
Case Study Alpha Case Study Beta Case Study Delta Case Study Gamma
Purchaser managers 4 4 13 9
Trust managers 6 8 8 6
SHA, regional office, regional commissioning support unit 1 1 3 4
Note: Because the Welsh NHS was undergoing fundamental restructuring we also completed a further 21interviews with politicians, special advisors, senior civil
servants, officials in Health Commission Wales and Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, and doctors managing the clinical networks.
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which a small percentage of a provider’s income
depended on outcomes for patients.
The Welsh Government was less enthusiastic about the
market mechanism and did not emulate England’s move
towards greater provider pluralism, choice and arm’s
length regulation. Instead of relying on oversight by CQC,
Wales opted to establish Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, a
conventional inspectorate located within a government
department. The commissioning process in Wales
remained subject to considerable top-down control by the
Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) and its
three regional offices, albeit with a concurrent emphasis
on localism and the ability of the then 22 LHBs to adapt
local plans to local circumstances. Just as in England,
although for different reasons, there was a mix of top-
down steering and decentralised decision-making, which
led to different outcomes in different localities.
By 2007 the Welsh NHS was using softer versions of
commissioning based largely of ideas about ‘collegiate
contracting’ and partnership working. Welsh purchasers
still purchased treatments via NHS contracts, but did so
within a framework which also emphasized planning.
The LHB’s contracts – its Long Term Agreements
(LTAs) - meshed with an Annual Operating Framework
(AOF) agreed with the regional office. This in turn was
aligned with the Health, Social Care and Well-being
Strategies agreed with local government. Thus the hori-
zontal service contract was nested in a set of vertical
performance agreements between LHBs or hospital
trusts and regional offices, which were enforceable
through hierarchical management processes. During the
study period Wales introduced a system of regional
commissioning in which groups of purchasing LHBs
were expected to coordinate their purchasing from local
providers.
The differences observed in the four case study local-
ities mostly related to areas of contracting policy that
had been influenced by the English NHS’s turn back to
markets. English commissioners purchased mainly on
PbR tariffs and Welsh LHBs continued to negotiate
local prices, and this was reflected in the latter’s greater
use of clauses dealing with marginal pricing in contracts.
While the use of financial incentives linked to CQUIN
was gaining momentum in England, the reverse was
happening in Wales, with the demise of the All Wales
Sanctions and Incentives Framework. Financial penalties
were an important tool supporting targets in England,
but were not implemented in Welsh LTAs. The Welsh
regional offices operated with a broader conception of
performance management than the SHAs, facilitating a
three-way negotiation with LHBs and trusts leading to
signing off the local annual operating frameworks, com-
pared with a narrower focus on enforcing targets in
England.
But these differences existed alongside large areas of
common ground. Both systems required purchasers to
base their service contracts on national model contracts
[24], which mandated the inclusion of certain standard
contract terms, and both in practice allowed some scope
for a flexible interpretation of these requirements when
compliance with the standard clauses caused difficulties.
Wales introduced rather more complex arbitration
arrangements than England, with the dual tracks of the
NHS contracts disputes settlement process and a ‘debt-
ors arbitration’ process, but overall the Welsh and Eng-
lish systems operated in broadly similar ways. The
overseeing bodies in both countries actively discouraged
contractual disputes, and put considerable pressure on
purchasers and providers contemplating use of formal
arbitration to negotiate compromise settlements.
Purchaser/provider relationships in Wales
Where England emphasised competition, Wales intro-
duced organisational arrangements – collegiate contract-
ing and the later regional contracting framework – that
recognised the importance of long-term relationships.
Under both arrangements the emphasis was on co-
operation and long-term understandings between pur-
chasers and providers in a local area. Distant purchasers
needing to buy services from a provider in another
region were expected to do so by liaising with a lead
purchaser in that region, normally using the quality spe-
cifications and other requirements already agreed by
that local purchaser. Thus rather than finding itself in
the position of a buyer completing a one-off transaction
with an unfamiliar partner, the distant LHB could bene-
fit from the ongoing relationships built up by the local
lead purchaser.
This top-down push towards co-operation did not mean
that adversarial behaviour was unknown in the Wales. In
fact, the commissioning climate had changed markedly
over the lifetime of the LHBs. A study of health authority
contracting completed by one of the authors in the 1990s
[25] found a cycle of adjustment in which more adversarial
contracting relations gave way to more co-operative ones,
and this pattern was repeated after the establishment of
LHBs. In the period from 2003 to 2006, contracting styles
took a reportedly adversarial and combative tone. Accord-
ing to respondents, purchaser/ provider relations became
more strained for several reasons: an ‘immaturity’ and lack
of capacity in commissioning organisations, an absence of
clear policy guidance on the funding responsibilities of
secondary and tertiary commissioners (following the
establishment of Health Commission Wales), and the
pressure on commissioners to achieve financial break-
even.
Partly because of a perception that there were too
many disputes in the system, the DHSS introduced a
Hughes et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13(Suppl 1):S7
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/S1/S7
Page 5 of 10
model LTA in 2007, followed by new guidance on com-
missioning which foreshadowed the establishment of
three regional commissioning support units (RCSUs). In
addition, the financial planning regime was changed so
that the Service and Financial Framework (SaFF), which
had existed from 2002-03, was replaced by an Annual
Operating Framework (AOF). The model LTA, though
not mandatory in all its particulars, helped to bring
more consistency in contracting practices and ended a
situation where documentation had often been unsatis-
factory or incomplete. The regional units were intended
to encourage co-operation among LHBs, enabling them
to negotiate on equal terms with trusts and achieve
lower transaction costs. Policy makers aimed to encou-
rage a more strategic approach to service planning asso-
ciated with the structured tri-annual planning system
advocated in the WAG’s Designed for Life strategy [26].
The Welsh approach remained softer than the English
‘targets and terror’ regime (a term that refers to the strong
management action, including sackings of senior staff,
taken to ensure compliance with central NHS targets)
[27]. Partly under the influence of the Wanless Report
[28], Welsh policy makers had emphasised the need for a
rounded assessment of performance that combined use of
targets with audit and inspection, including self-assess-
ment. Nevertheless, the pressure on senior managers
increased after 2008-09 when each NHS organisation was
required to agree an AOF with the regional office contain-
ing national and local targets. The Gamma trust finance
director told us that he found himself ‘concentrating on
waiting times numbers more than you are concentrating
on the contract activity levels’. On the commissioner side,
LHB finance directors needed to work on developing ser-
vice specifications linked to AOF targets.
In one of the two Welsh case studies relations
between the LHB and main local trust had become very
difficult in the year prior to the research, largely because
of a protracted dispute about the interpretation of a
contract clause on marginal pricing. It was only when
one of the main protagonists (the LHB finance director)
moved elsewhere that relations improved. Subsequently
the LHB rewrote the contract clause concerned with
marginal payment rates to rectify an ambiguity exposed
by the case.
More generally a number of LHB respondents expressed
frustration with a system that combined top-down com-
mand with an implied ability to utilise contractual levers.
They complained that the effectiveness of such levers was
undermined by the unwillingness of the DHSS to support
mechanisms such as penalties or arbitration. For example,
a number of commissioners recounted their experiences
in relation to small block contracts with distant providers.
Typically, the value of these contracts had been set by the
resource allocation exercise that determined the monies
allocated to LHBs when they were established. But some
LHBs had reviewed these contracts and determined that
they were overpaying distant providers when compared
with the prices charged by local providers for the same
treatments. They lobbied the DHSS to replace the block
contracts with cost per case contracts to reduce costs, but
found it unwilling to risk destabilising the financial viabi-
lity of the trusts by making this change.
The DHSS also sought to limit the use of contractual
penalties and formal arbitration in contract disputes, fear-
ing that these would encourage the adversarial relation-
ships that had caused problems in the past. One LHB
finance director told us: ‘[There were] potential penalties...
I’m struggling to remember what they were, but basically
we were told anecdotally don’t implement them, you
won’t be supported.’ All the LHBs interviewed had discon-
tinued use of penalty clauses, including penalties for long
waiting times which had been common in an earlier per-
iod, by the time of the study. Many respondents painted a
picture of growing co-operation at this time: as one trust
chief executive put it: ‘If you ain’t got enough money to
come to the table to buy what you are ready to buy, then
there is going to have to be a goodwill basis’.
It might be hypothesized that the Welsh planned
economy would lead to a more prescriptive approach
towards use of standard contracts compared to England.
This was not supported by our data. Several commis-
sioners made minor adjustments to the all-Wales long-
term agreement (LTA) and one trust finance director
explained that the standard template had simply not
been followed in LTAs with the main provider, mainly
on the basis of unsuitability in the local context:
We did our own one which was based very much
around concentrating on what we had to.... what we
were doing together how we were working together
and just recognising that there needed to be sensible
dialogue and sensible cut off points in the year that
we could use to measure how we were doing against
the contract. But we had to allow some flexibility in
it on both sides. (Delta trust3, finance director)
The final days of the internal market in Wales saw an
acknowledgement that contracts would now only have a
brief life in the transition to a system based on planning,
and the running down of the negotiating and monitoring
arrangements built up in previous years. This was a period
when many meetings were cancelled and tasks that had
been carried out in team forums were instead handled in
one-to-one meetings between chief executives or finance
directors. It was not so much that cooperative behaviour
increased per se, but that LHB staff knew they would soon
be subsumed into unified bodies and became more willing
to compromise on contractual requirements. Although
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guidance required NHS organisations to enter cost-and-
volume contracts for most services, purchasers realised
that there would be little possibility of holding providers
accountable for non-performance and in consequence
many of these contracts took a loose ‘block’ form. This led
to a simplification of contractual documents, with little
attention paid to issues like marginal pricing, and floors
and ceilings set so wide as to be nominal.
In Wales, commissioners had moved towards softer
forms of contracting over several years. However, rather
than developing organically, the relationships between
purchasers and providers were further transformed
when in 2008 a new Welsh coalition government
announced its intention to end the internal market. The
final stages of fieldwork saw a kind of forced collabora-
tion between neighbouring LHBs, and between LHBs
and trusts. Purchasers no longer talked of contracts as
instruments that could be used to lever service improve-
ments and, though the language of partnership and co-
operation was much in evidence, this was not so much
a reflection of the growth of relational contract norms
but the diminished importance of the contracting
framework.
Relationality in England
Conversely the hardening of the English market did not
result in a uniform trend towards more adversarial rela-
tionships. In both case studies, apparently friendly rela-
tions at the personal level co-existed with a significant
degree of toughness and tension in the contracting pro-
cess. Most significantly we found clear examples of coop-
erative behaviour at junctures in the contracting round
when serious financial problems appeared imminent. Even
in one case where relationships appeared to worsen in the
second year of fieldwork (2009-10), there was a willingness
to interpret contractual terms flexibly if a serious problem
seemed likely to lead to intervention from the overseeing
SHA.
In case study Alpha in Year 1 (2008-09) the meetings
we observed were generally conducted in good humour
and differences were resolved amicably. Nevertheless,
disagreements arose over certain issues that came very
close to arbitration, with participants seeking advice
from the SHA and in at least one instance from lawyers.
During Year 2, there were significant changes in con-
tracting personnel, especially on the trust side. This,
together with escalating issues relating to the trust’s
data accuracy, led to relationships between the PCT and
the trust becoming more formal and adversarial.
Alpha PCT staff complained that the trust was not
delivering adequately on a number of contractual
requirements, especially those related to data accuracy
and transparency. Failure to provide credible or detailed
data concerning activity on the part of the trust left the
parties unable to reach agreement on activity forecasting
and therefore on the overall contract value. The PCT
felt that the trust was stubbornly refusing to acknowl-
edge the poor quality of the data returned:
The problems were to do with the quality of the data
from the trust, and in my opinion, I recognise it’s
very much a one-sided opinion, we could have
avoided quite a lot of the issues if there’d been an
acknowledgement up front by the trust that actually
the data was… you know… wasn’t good. Because that
was the situation we got to in June-July, and actually
we could have been there a lot earlier. So that cer-
tainly didn’t help. Also the financial pressures that
the trust were under obviously hindered things. And I
think perhaps there’s not a history of openness
between the two organisations that might have
helped us to speed things along a bit. (Alpha PCT,
finance director)
After a number of successful data challenges by the
PCT, the trust’s new finance director warned that cutting
the contractual payment would endanger the trust’s finan-
cial viability. After further negotiations, and taking account
of the trust’s financial problems, the parties agreed to sign
a ‘block contract’ containing less stringent data require-
ments. In the words of Alpha PCT’s finance director : ‘at
least we had certainty having the block contract, so there
was no risk associated with that contract…it was afford-
able and it capped our risk, so we decided, you know, per-
haps in the circumstances it was a price worth paying, if
you like’. By the end of the study the trust was improving
its contract information system and efforts were being
made on both sides to rebuild relationships.
Relationships in case study Beta ranged from civil and
formal to very friendly. Close personal relationships
between finance directors proved on occasion very help-
ful in reaching a mutually acceptable deal for their
respective trusts.
One feature of this case study was the difficult finan-
cial position in which one PCT found itself. Because
Beta PCT2 was in a healthy financial position, while
Beta PCT1 was not, Beta trust3 found that only one
partner PCT could afford to fund planned service devel-
opments. This also meant that Beta PCT1 was hesitant
to sign up to jointly-agreed treatment protocols that
might have increased its costs, and trust staff became
concerned about postcode-based differences in the ser-
vices provided.
It might be assumed that less problematic finances led
to better relationships and respondents indeed reported
that relations between Beta PCT2 and Beta trust3 were
generally good. But even here there were areas of tension.
Trust respondents suggested that the PCT’s management
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of the contracting processes has been weak, manifested
for example in its failure to put in place a proper struc-
ture for the contracting cycle. The PCT in turn had been
frustrated with the trust’s slowness in submitting data (an
issue that resulted in threats to go to arbitration):
I do think there’s (...) at a deeper level, a lot of mistrust
in terms of sharing information...I mean the view from
people here is that for a long time, the [trust] have been
very hesitant about sharing information and data...At
a deeper level there is a lot of, well, we feel they’re
sometimes covering up things and not being quite as
open as they should be. (Beta PCT2, assistant director
of contracting and performance).
Nevertheless local circumstances bound these two orga-
nizations together. Beta trust3 was the single major sec-
ondary and tertiary provider in Beta PCT2’s catchment
area, so that there was a strong incentive to maintain a
cooperative relationship. The option of purchasing services
elsewhere made less sense than in a situation where a PCT
was close to multiple competing acute trusts. Likewise, the
trust’s viability depended on the support of its main
purchaser. This mutual dependency meant that the two
organisations were locked into a relationship where non-
co-operation was not an option.
When you look at local health economies, the situa-
tions are all very different, so if you have a local
health economy that primarily just consists of one
PCT and one trust, you know, and for the trust, 85%
of his income comes from the PCT; and for the PCT,
85% of his expenditure goes to the trust, you’ve got
no choice but to work in harmony. Because, unless
you think that somebody outside is going to come
and bail you out, those two organisations have got to
sort it out. (Beta trust3, finance director).
This inter-dependency also applied to the financially-
strapped Beta PCT1 and its main provider Beta trust2. In
a situation where the PCT was unable to pay for an
unanticipated surge in activity, the two organisations
agreed to relax the PbR rules so that the trust was paid
at what were effectively marginal rates rather than
according to tariff. Respondents suggested that this was
because of the perceived importance of protecting the
solvency of their commissioner, which was also in the
trust’s long-term interest:
I mean, we’ve always tried to adopt, I hope, the prin-
ciple that we want to work with them and not
against them. I don’t like confrontation. There is
absolutely no advantage for this hospital, for them to
be in financial difficulty. So, we want to work with
them. We don’t want to bankrupt them. (Beta trust2,
Finance Director)
In England, the de facto interdependency of local part-
ners in a managed market, especially against the back-
ground of the reluctance of Monitor and the SHAs to
allow formal arbitration, pushed organisations towards
co-operation. This was so even in a contracting round
where a degree of conflict was manifest. Although this
may be viewed as a kind of ‘forced’ relationality, the
compromise settlements that kept the market on track
would have been hard to achieve without personal rela-
tionships across the purchaser/provider split between
actors who had known each other for many years.
When things went wrong, especially in situations where
financial difficulties threatened to de-stabilise a PCT or
trust, the smoothing effect of social relations was
evident.
Conclusion
The internal market systems that had developed in
England and Wales by the late 2000s differed in their
specifics, but both involved a mix of conflictual and co-
operative behaviour. Both systems allowed for the use of
harder-edged market levers such as contractual penalties
and incentives, although English policy makers were
strengthening these levers at just the time they were falling
into disuse in Wales. Crucially, however, the ultimate mar-
ket lever of ‘exit’ - ending an exchange relationship and
finding a new contracting partner - was not available to
NHS organisations. In most cases purchasers and provi-
ders were bound together by geography, history and
patient expectations (people wished to use their local hos-
pital). Taken together with the reluctance of the oversee-
ing authorities to allow contractual disputes to progress to
arbitration, this bilateral interdependency forced local pur-
chasers and providers to find their own solutions, some-
times bending the rules to do so. The compromises
achieved generally emerged from negotiations within rela-
tional networks that had developed over a long period.
While a case study investigation like this one can only sug-
gest, rather than prove, the importance of relationality, the
propositions about interdependency and co-operative
behaviour put forward here are consistent with the find-
ings of other recent studies, such as those by Exworthy et
al. and Porter et al in this supplement.
These findings have implications for the latest NHS
reforms now being implemented in England. In our
English case studies we found examples where rules were
bent to safeguard the financial situation of both a PCT
and a trust. Probably many frontline actors have counte-
nanced such practices as a way of maintaining a func-
tional service in difficult times, but some policy makers
see such self-protective behaviour as an undesirable
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attempt to buffer organisations from market levers that
would otherwise improve efficiency. In our view the latest
reforms in England, which will sweep away the layers of
management associated with the PCTs and SHAs, rest
on a perception that too many actors in these organisa-
tions were willing covertly to resist and undermine the
English provider market that Government was seeking to
introduce.
Yet there must be real doubts about whether a reform
model inspired by one approach within micro-econom-
ics – principal-agent theory and related prescriptions for
the proper design of incentives – can deliver improve-
ments over the existing system. As Macneil and others
have argued, relationality is a crucial feature of contract-
ing in ordinary commercial markets. An English NHS
characterised by increased provider pluralism, an influx
of new commissioning experts, an exodus of experi-
enced managers and an increasing number of ‘first-time’
(and possible one-off) contracts with new contracting
partners, is at odds with theory from socio-legal studies
and institutional economics predicting that certain ser-
vices are best delivered within long-term relationships
[12,29]. The dismantling of existing relational networks
poses the real risk that a mechanism that allows flexibil-
ity in times of trouble will not be there if things go
wrong. We suggested earlier that the NHS of the late
2000s was characterised by a kind of ‘forced’ relational-
ity created by the particular dynamics of the managed
market of the time, but nevertheless supported by inter-
personal contacts built up over many years. In an Eng-
lish NHS populated by Clinical Commissioning Groups,
commissioning support agencies, a plurality of providers,
the NHS Commissioning Board and the regulators,
there will be times when things go wrong, and pressures
will grow to again build bridges and turn to co-operative
behaviour, but this time in circumstances where infor-
mal service networks and organisational memory have
been severely damaged.
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